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ABSTRACT
Past research has solidified that breakthrough innovations are often prevalent in the
context of entrants rather than incumbents. However, market leaders have been able to
survive the disruption caused by market newcomers despite the irregularities of
breakthrough innovations within incumbents. This paper will connect current research
in corporate intrapreneurship from all perspectives including organizational behavior,
corporate governance, incentive programs, and cultural relevance. Drawing from
published literature and case studies this research will substantiate the following claim
that the success of leading intrapreneurial organizations is due to their capability to
support an ecosystem of innovative organizational choices in accordance with their
goals and objectives. This paper will propose that there are three main steps to fostering
a sustainable startup mentality within an organization. These phases include idea
generation, supporting new corporate ventures, and creating a positive learning cycle.
Within each phase, the firm has to pay special attention to important aspects of the
organization including organizational culture, corporate structure, venture selection,
team formation, venture programs, supportive infrastructure, sustainable venture
development and positive learning cycles.
Thesis Supervisor: Scott Stern
Title: School of Management Distinguished Professor of Technological Innovation,
Entrepreneurship and Strategic Management, MIT Sloan School of Management
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Corporate Intrapreneurship: Steps to Building a Sustainable Startup Mentality
Within an Established Organization
Companies are fundamentally in conflict with the concept of new ventures
(Sykes & Block, 1989). Established companies are built on management requirements
that are rigid, routine, and structured, causing them to miss out on important industry
trends. However, it's these new product markets that offer firms the means of
diversifying and provide a opportunity for future growth and profitability (Roberts &
Berry, 1984). Roberts and Berry (1984), suggested that the alternative approaches to new
business development can include "internal development, acquisition, joint ventures
and minority investments of venture capital" (p. 2).
Previous research has also revealed that there are many different innovation-
enabling competencies and processes (i.e., innovation strategies) that have become
prominent trends in many industries and plays a large role in how entrants (i.e., early
stage startups) enter the market and how incumbents (i.e., established firms) stay ahead
of the market (Bessant, Robert, & Venables, 2008; Schumpeter, 1934). These strategic
innovation trends pertain to but are not limited to open innovation, aligning
departmental priorities, knowledge creation, and employee innovation incentives.
However, as we learn more about how these strategies are implemented, it has become
more apparent that it is often more effective to set in place a portfolio of innovation-
enabling competencies and processes within one firm than to have a single all-
encompassing platform. This combination of strategies can foster an intrapreneurship
ecosystem that is essential for a sustainable startup mentality.
It is to say that there isn't a one-size-fits-all innovation strategy that can
efficiently account for all the different aspects that innovation needs in order to breed
effectively and sustainably. This means that there is an array of different strategies that
foster innovation within different organizational departments. For example, repetitive
tasks that provide low resources were negatively correlated with the amount of
'innovativeness' of white-collar workers. However, structured routine were a necessary
aspect of workplace efficiency for blue-collar employees (Spiegelaere, Gyes, &
Hootegem, 2012). Therefore innovation strategies must be assessed in combination
rather than on an individual basis. Hence, using a holistic lens on organizational
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innovation strategies (i.e., a portfolio of innovation strategies) is an important next step
in understanding intrapreneurship.
This paper will define the parameters that pertain to intrapreneurship, as well as
the assumptions made in this research. After which, background for the research is
outlined including the importance and scope of the paper, how innovation is measured,
the principles that intrapreneurship originated from, and a historical review of the
trends of innovation since the 1950's. After which, the intrapreneurship ecosystem will
be introduced through the steps to building a sustainable startup mentality. These steps
will compose of three main components: fostering an innovative landscape, building a
supportive intrapreneurship infrastructure, and creating a positive learning cycle.
Background
Definitions and Assumptions
Simply put, intrapreneurship is entrepreneurship within a large organization
(Antoncic & Hisrich, 2003). Pinchot and Pinchot (1978) coined the term and referred to
these entrepreneurs as "intra-corporate entrepreneurs" or "intrapreneurs". Previous to
this phenomenon, it was common practice that entrepreneurs leave their large firms
and create small firms to exploit the technology that they created while they were at the
large firm (Pinchot III, 1985). This is because these large firms were not equipped to
incentivize innovation within their organization and often had policies that constrained
further development (Meng & Roberts 1996). However, large companies soon realized
the benefits of harnessing the entrepreneurial spirit within their organization and began
to maximize the potential of their human capital. Pinchot (1985) defined intrapreneurs
as visionaries who have the direct responsibility of creating innovation within an
organization. This visionary need not be the creator or inventor, but he or she must
have hands-on involvement of turning this idea to reality and actively try to turn a
profit from the new corporate venture (Pinchot, 1985).
In popular literature, corporate innovator and intrapreneur are sometimes used
interchangeably. However, even though many intrapreneurs evolve from innovators, it
is important to recognize that the distinction lays in the role they play and where their
involvement takes place in the business life cycle. Figure 1 as adapted from Meng and
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Robers (1996) illustrates the role the innovator has in a business life cycle and the point
at which the innovator takes on the role of an intrapreneur. Essentially, the innovator is
involved with idea creation, initial research, customer feedback, and prototyping. It is
only after the business plan is generated, does the innovator become the intrapreneur.
The intrapreneur then takes the idea through rapid prototyping and then to market or
in other cases used within the organization for internal benefits. That is, the moment the
innovator begins linking the prototype to real market opportunities, he or she has
crossed the threshold from innovator to intrapreneur. The main aspect of an
intrapreneur is the commitment he or she makes to bring the prototype to market.
Similar to Venture Capitalists' emphasis on investing in entrepreneurs instead of the
business plan, large organizations are often more likely to invest resources to support
committed intrapreneurs (Meng & Roberts 1996).
Figure 1. From Innovator to Intrapreneur - Roles in a Business Life Cycle
(as adapted and developed from Meng and Robers, 1996)
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Innovation is not a new field of study. According to Schumpeterian theory
(Schumpeter, 1934), the "process of creative destruction" allow incumbents to hold only
temporary monopoly power until a more innovative product or service, which is
usually delivered by fresh entrants, disrupt the market and overthrows the incumbent.
The idea that even large established firms need to embrace "creative destruction" or
face an inevitable demise has become a standard in assessing the survivability of a
company. Moreover, it is also believed that small firms are principle drivers of
innovation because of the lower risk that new entrants experience relative to
incumbents (Schumpeter, 1934).
The vocabulary used for describing innovation is vast, contextual, and differs
from paper to paper (Garcia & Calantone, 2002). To mitigate this issue, this paper (as
many papers before it) will follow the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development's (OECD) Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005), which defines innovation as "the
implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or
process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business
practices, workplace organization or external relations" (OECD, 2005, p. 47).
Importance of Intrapreneurship
Much of the previous research has already tested and accepted the importance of
innovation in generating economic value both for the firm and the market at large. It is
through innovation that firms can better defend their market position or even gain
market advantage over their competitors (Tirole, 1995). As previously mentioned,
innovation is not just a benefit to adding competitive advantage, but it's also crucial for
survival for incumbents (Baumol, 2002). This is especially true for multinational
enterprises (MNEs) because they face fierce local competition at the subsidiary level as
well as direct competition from other MNEs (Franko, 1989; Hitt et al., 1996).
Studies have also drawn correlations between innovation and the improvement
of quality of life (Martinez-Fernandez & Potts 2009). Innovation is also deemed as a
significant driver for the productivity and prosperity of a region. It can be credited for
industry growth, job creation, and the development of smart technologies and new
skills (OECD, 1999). Recent research has also shown that innovation can have a positive
impact on fringes of cities as well. From the results of the Innovation at the Edges'
project (Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2005), innovation was found to play a significant role
6
in generating prosperity, industry growth and the creation of new jobs in the South
West suburbs of Sydney, Australia.
In 2008, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD,
2008) Creative Economy Report, indicated that cultural and creative industries in Italy
accounted for over 9% of the GDP and responsible for the jobs of more than 2.5 million
people. Similar figures were seen in other countries with leading creative industries:
10% in Sweden, 12% in Denmark, 5.8% in the UK, and 3.3% in the United States
(UNCTAD, 2008).
Scope of Paper
As the definition for innovation stated in the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005), we will
focus on breakthrough (i.e., discontinuous) innovations that have made large impacts in
generating new businesses or product lines based on new ideas or technologies
(Morone, 1993). This will also include innovations that have made substantial cost
reductions that have changed consumption patters within a particular market (Garcia &
Calantone, 2002). That is, this paper will not focus on incremental (i.e., discontinuous)
innovations that make small and continuous improvements in product and service
features including less substantial cost saving measures (Bessant, 2003). This is because
breakthrough innovations involve more risks and organization buy-in, which can be
measured on a larger scale and typically involve more complex organizational support
than incremental innovations. Namely, the success of breakthrough innovations
depends on a multitude of factors including managerial sponsorship and the generation
of technological and business value.
It also needs to be noted that the impact of job design on the effectiveness of
fostering innovative work behaviors differ between blue- and white-collar employees
(Spiegelaere, Gyes, & Hootegem, 2012). For example, jobs with low resources and
require short repetitive routines drastically hinder innovativeness of white-collar
workers. Where as, there is less of a negative correlation with blue-collar workers
(Spiegelaere, Gyes, & Hootegem, 2012). Even though we will look at a cross-section of
many different industries, we will mainly set our focus on innovation generated by
white-collar workers.
Traditional studies of intrapreneurship have focused extensively on intra-firm
innovation (Antoncic, 2001). This relates to any form of intrapreneurship that occurs
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within a firm including new corporate ventures and product and service innovations.
However, there has been a recent shift towards an emphasis on inter-firm innovation,
which includes network effects and strategic alliances. More and more, firms are
looking towards inter-organizational relationship and partnership with other
companies to spark innovation and collaborate on new product and process
development (Smith, Dickson & Smith, 1991). Though both intra-firm and inter-firm
intrapreneurship are both important (Foray, 1991), this paper will use intrapreneurship
as it pertains to both intra-firm and inter-firm innovations unless specified otherwise.
Measuring Innovation
Quantifying innovation has been the basis of many ongoing research debates
because innovation can be achieved in many ways (e.g., disruptive cost reductions, viral
marketing, etc.), which means that a single measure of innovation is not enough to
capture the entire story (Shapiro, 2006). For example, a firm that produces 50 high
quality novel patents is arguably "more innovative" than a firm that produces 100
minimally innovative patents.
These methods involve looking at a number of aspects within the organization
including revenue generation, new products /process /services created, patent quantity,
research productivity and more recently patent quality. When evaluating innovation
with more than one measure, it's most accurate when the method can capture both
quantitative and qualitative attributes (Shapiro, 2006). The most popular method is
looking at the revenue of the new product and the revenue of the entire product line,
which is equivalent to the percent of revenue derived from the new product. That is, the
former gages the success of the new product on its own and the latter captures the
impact that new product had on the existing product line.
Another more recent method is to assess the number of patents produced in a
firm as well as the quality of those patents (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004). The output
of patents purely for patent sake is not enough if the quality of those patents is poor or
if the amount of innovation achieved is minimal. However, this can also be paired with
research productivity, which is the ratio of patents over the amount of research and
development (R&D) investment made over a certain time period (Lanjouw &
Schankerman, 2004). At the micro data (i.e., firm) level, patent quality has been
addressed through the quantity of patent renewals (Schankerman & Pakes, 1986),
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patent citations (Trajtenberg, 1990), claims in the patent application (Tong & Frame,
1994), and the patent family size (Putnam, 1996), which is the frequency of the patent
being taken out in other countries.
This paper will act as an extension of previous research and seek out patterns of
portfolio innovation strategies including strategies that are not easily quantifiable
including the behavioral, interpersonal, cultural aspects of an organization. More over,
even though strategies at the individual level have been studied extensively, firm level
innovation is equally important (Covin & Slevin, 1991) and in this paper, both will be
considered equally weighted.
Literature Review
History of the Innovation Process
Rothwell (1994) outlined five generations of innovation processes (Table 1) that
spanned from the 1950's to the mid-1990's. Each generation provided a new set of
opportunities and constraints that influenced how firms and industries innovated.
During the Post-War II era (First Generation), R&D was sought out as a new tool for
problem solving as firms pushed technology into the market and often without the
necessary demand in place. This generation theorized a linear relationship between
R&D and output where companies considered more resources dedicated to R&D lead to
more successful products. It wasn't until the second generation that innovation shifted
towards the demand side, which focused on product marketing relative to new product
development. This shift towards market pull created a reactive R&D strategy that
focused on improving existing technology. This was also the era where the US
government stepped in and started experimenting with public policy as a means of
boosting innovation; namely industrial innovation.
The third generation gave birth to intrapreneurship and the understanding that
innovation success within the firm rested on skilled and passionate individuals. It was
also theorized that innovation also depended on a multitude of factors that all needed
to be performed in a "balanced and well coordinated manner" (Rothwell, 1994, p11).
Innovation processes grew increasingly more complex and the addition of academic
work in the area propelled the fourth generation to focus on integration and parallel
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development. Technology, especially IT-based, was also a cause for larger global
manufacturing processes and shortened product life cycles. Japan lead this era, which
set new manufacturing standards such as Just-in-time (UIT) manufacturing.
The last generation as summarized by Rothwell (1994), showed the beginnings of
Lean Innovation, a practice that emphasizes on creating and preserving value for the
end customer by using an optimized amount of resources (Claus & Sonnenberg, 2011).
That is, a process that uses fewer resources and provides the same amount of value to
the consumer is arguably more 'lean' than a process that uses more resources. As well,
more advances in technology including CAD, integrative IT, and digital databases just
to name a few, allowed for better manufacturing coordination. This allowed for very
complex and sophisticated processes to develop including parallel real-time
information processing. More over, companies also started looking externally for
partnerships and alliances to boost innovation, which created a network effect for
innovation processes. That is, the innovation of an individual firm became dependent
on the network of R&D firms that the individual firm was part of. Larger networks lead
to more partnerships and alliances, which in turn brought more innovation to members
of the partnership.
Table 1. Five Generations of Innovation Processes
(adapted and developed from Rothwell, 1994)
ERAS INNOVATION TRENDS OUTCOMES
First Generation Pro-active R&D
(1950 - 1965) New industries
Post- War // Industrialization Technology Push No improvement on innovation processes
Linear R&D approach: more R&D resources
leads to more successful new products
Reactive R&D
Second Generation Increase manufacturing productivity
(1965 - 1970) Market Pull Innovation based on existing technologies
A shift towards demand Emphasis on marketing
Technological incrementalism
Public policy procurement
Third Generation "Coupling" Model of Start of empirical innovation studies
(1970 - 1985) Innovation (Rothwell and Increasingly complex innovation process
Birth of Intrapreneurship Zegveld, pSO) Innovation as multi-factored approach
Intrapreneurs at heart of success
Fourth Generation Emphasis on Technology Pushed Economic Recovery (Peters and
(1985 -1990) Strategy Waterman, 1982)
/ntegration & Parallel Improved manufacturing strategy (Bessant,
Development IT-based manufacturing 1991)
"Design for manufacturability" movement
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Global Strategy Emergence External networking effect
Shortened product life Creation of time-based strategies (e.g., JIT in
cycles Japan)
Emphasis on control of product development
Increasing resource speed and "fast innovation" to accelerate
constraints product development.
Design for Manufacturability
Fifth Generation Systems Integration and Networking (SIN)
(1990- 1995) Increased Corporate Flexibility &
Technology-enabled Innovation Lean Innovation ResponsivenessNetworking (joint and collaborative strategic
alliances)
Parallel (real time) Information Processing
Concern for the Intensified regulationsEnvironment
History of Corporate Venture Investments
After the success of organized venture capital funds in the early 1960's, corporate
venture funds took shape and began to trend after the mid-1960's during the second
generation of innovation processes. By the early 1970's, over 25% of the Fortune 500
companies have tested the waters with their own corporate venture programs. Major
firms in the U.S. including DuPont, Exxon, Ford, and General Electric all began
experimenting with venture capital investment (VCI) programs for the purpose of new
business development. These corporate venture programs took on two forms: internal
and external (Gompers & Lerner, 2000). Even though the two forms of corporate
venture programs vary on many different respects, both mirror the trend of the overall
venture capital market. That is, when venture capital funds are large, so are corporate
venture funds and vice versa.
External corporate venture programs involve investment in outside startups that
were independent of the corporation. Much like any other investor, external
investments are made directly to the independently managed startup and usually along
side other venture capital firms, while the corporation is treated as any other investor.
Some companies make investments directly to the startup and can even have an
influence on the board of directors at the startup. On the other hand, internal corporate
ventures are initiatives developed and funded with the company's own resources
(Gompers & Lerner, 2000). This paper will focus on these VCIs for internally developed
corporate ventures.
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There was a brief period after 1973, where corporate venture programs both
internal and external began to decline because of a sudden drop in initial public
offerings (IPO). This meant that investors patiently waiting for their companies to go
public would never see their hopes materialize and the once lucrative investments were
only yielding mild returns (Fast, 1978). Though in 1979 two groundbreaking
amendments resurrected the venture capital sector. Specifically, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act was amended to allow pension funds to actively invest
in high-risk assets including venture capital funds. Another key change was the
lowering of the capital gains tax rates, which lowered the risk for all investors. These
two factors boosted corporate venture funding, which peaked in 1986 where nearly 12%
(nearly $2 billion) of the total venture pool was attributed to corporate venture funds.
Yet, the venture capital sector took another hit in 1987 when the stock market
crashed, sending investments into sharp declines. The after math of the crash carried on
for years and by 1992, the venture pool shrank to only 5% of what it was at the peak,
while one-third of all corporate venture programs were dissolved. It wasn't until the
mid-1990s did corporate venture capital begun to recover (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).
Today, corporate venture funds are becoming increasingly important to startups
(Forbes, 2013). In 2012, approximately 16% of acquired companies had some form of
Corporate Venture Capital (CVC). More impressively, in 2013 thus far, 90% of all
companies scheduled for IPOs that year involve CVC.
The Principles of Intrapreneurship
As mentioned above, innovation is the result of many complex inter-dependent
factors that can impede or strengthen the innovativeness of a firm. Naturally, these
factors will have either a positive or negative affect on innovation, which will either
foster or impede upon the innovativeness of a firm respectively. These factors, whether
positive or negative, can be dynamic or static, ongoing or stagnant. They can also occur
at all levels of the organization (e.g., on the plant floor or at C-level management) and
across disciplines or departments (e.g., manufacturing, marketing, sales, human
resource).
Pinchot and Pinchot (1978) was the first to recognize "intra-corporate
entrepreneurship" and laid the foundation that outlined 8 methods of creating and
supporting entrepreneurship within a company. Though in practice, some of these
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principles may not be as practical and should be negotiated on a per project bases.
(Table 2) below is adapted from these original ideologies and outlines the principles of
creating intrapreneurs and keeping them within the organization.
Table 2. Principles of Establishing Intrapreneurs
(as adapted and developed from Pinchot and Pinchot 1978)
PRINCIPLE RATIONALE SUGGESTED METHOD
1. Intrapreneurs must risk - To increase intrapreneurial conviction Hold salary increases or salary
something of value to and drive cuts and make them
him/herself * To provide a binding contract between contingent on project
the corporation and the intrapreneur completion
* To help other employees rationalize
the intrapreneur's future rewards
(e.g., royalties, salary raises, bonuses,
etc.)
2. The organization and the - To align the priorities of the Setup a committee that
intrapreneur must share the intrapreneur and organization negotiates on the company's
rewards from the project (i.e., - To ensure organization buy-in behalf of a pre-established
revenue, recognition, etc.) in a percent of the value of the
well-defined and equitable way company
3. The successful intrapreneur * To keep talented intrapreneurs within Allot 10% of the revenues
should earn complete control of the organization from the project (in addition
an allotment of R&D funds (i.e., * To incentivize long-term planning to the cash bonus) for the
"intra-capital") . To produce more sustainable project intrapreneur's personal "intra-
results capital" R&D funds
- To allow projects to extend past its
first iteration
4. The intrapreneur should have e To lower the barrier of investing in Set a precedent that
independence when investing riskier projects and ideas intrapreneurs are
his or her intra-capital as long * To foster a corporate environment that "untouchable by corporate
as it is within the bounds of the breeds creativity and innovation discipline" when it comes to
law * To allow an ongoing learning cycle for investing his or her intra-
accomplished intrapreneurs capital
5. Every new venture should have - To provide a forum where due Set up an internal expertise
a Venture Capital style diligence can be performed committee that will do their
screening process including * To ensure a higher quality of projects due diligence on the
pitching a business plan receive corporate funding and intrapreneur's entire business
resources, and in turn have a higher plan
probability of generating higher
returns
6. Allow continuously successful - To build a community of Set up "Venture Capitalist"
intrapreneurs to create intrapreneurship within the designations within the
employee intra-capital organization company and provide
syndicates where they can back - To diversify the corporate risk of taking quarterly cycles where
other employee projects that on intrapreneur projects employees can pitch their
do not get funded at the * To give more employees the ideas and potentially get
corporate level opportunity for intrapreneurship funded by their intrapreneur
* To boost the quantity and quality of peers
R&D efforts
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7. The corporation has right of * To allow for more efficient use of Unsuccessful intrapreneurs
first refusal for all new products corporate R&D funds and not let new can raise funds from the
or services developed by its technology go to waste internal venture capital
intrapreneurs. However, if a * To foster a more cohesive intrapreneur committee or other successful
product or service is rejected, ecosystem within the corporation intrapreneurs to bring their
the intrapreneur must have product to market.
other avenues of acquiring
funding to bring his or her
product to market
8. Policies and management * To ensure that the chaos of the Perform bi-annual corporate
methods within the company intrapreneurship ecosystem does not debriefs that challenge
should always be revisited to overthrow the structure of the current procedures and
ensure that the functionality of organization provide avenues where
the corporation is optimal - To allow for adoption of new methods change can occur and new
and procedures that are beneficial to policies can be adopted
the organization
On the contrary, barriers to innovation are categorized as "revealed" or
"deterring" (D'Este et al., 2011). The former describes barriers that occur when the firm
has already committed to innovation. The latter pertains to obstacles that prevent firms
from engaging in innovative activity. That is, deterring factors are seen by the firm as
insurmountable and prevents the firm from initiating innovation, while revealed
barriers are difficulties during the process of innovation.
The perception of deterring barriers may be different between firms and failures
can be attributed to positive learning cycles (Dixon, 1999), where firms become better
equipped to deal with similar obstacles when encountered in the future. Organizational
learning is actually crucial for companies to deal with not only unprecedented change
(Dixon, 1999), but also evoke change, which is essential to intrapreneurship. This also
indicates that there is no significant correlation between the number of failures to the
level of risk aversion at a firm. Some of the most innovative firms also face the most
number of revealed barriers and the highest number of failed projects (Pablo et al.,
2012). Positive learning cycles will be revisited in detail as a main component to
building a sustainable intrapreneurship strategy.
Factors Affecting Intrapreneurship
The main focus on this paper is innovation strategy within the firm and the
impact it has on intrapreneurship. Innovation strategy is defined as "a strategy that
promotes the development and implementation of new products and services (Robbins,
1996)." Shoukry and Wang (1993) indicated that there are three main factors that affect
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innovation at the firm level (Figure 2): initiatives, structure, and culture. First, structure
pertains to the organizational structure and mission that the firm is built on. Namely, a
flexible organizational structure, fluid synthesis between different business units, and a
collective orientation that instills a common sense of trust and purpose are imperative
for intrapreneurship. Second, the culture of an organization must also have an openness
of information exchange and a promotive environment where risk-taking and
challenging the status quo are common. Ideally, the culture should have an element of
collegiality where power and authority is equally distributed and responsibility is
shared. Third, initiatives are proactive programs that are explicitly geared towards
promoting intrapreneurship. Differing from structure and culture where innovation
and intrapreneurship are bi-products amongst other positive organizational efficiencies,
the sole purpose of initiatives is to spark innovation. These include, benefit and reward
systems, corporate venture arms, and other initiatives that lower opportunity costs for
entrepreneurs.
Figure 2. Factors Affecting Intrapreneurship
(adapted and developed from Shoukry and Wang, 1993)
STRUCTURE
*Flexibility
-Synthesis
-Collective Orientation
CULTURE
INTRAPRENEURSHIP * Open & Promotive Climate
& Collegiality
INNOVATION * Risk-taking
INITIATIVES
*Benefit & Reward Systems
*Corporate Venture Arms
*Low Opportunity Costs
This paper will take the all-inclusive approach and take into all three factors as
part of a company's 'innovation strategy'. That is, since organizational culture,
structure, and strategy are all choices made on at the firm level, it will be important that
each of these components are broken down and assessed as part of the portfolio of
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innovation strategies that the organization deploys. This paper will build upon these
influencing factors as outlined by Shoukry and Wang (1993) and propose a holistic
approach to fostering intrapreneurship where structure, culture and initiatives are inter-
dependent elements of an overall dynamic innovation strategy.
Steps to Building a Sustainable Startup Mentality
The methodology of building a sustainable internal corporate intrapreneurship
strategy is composed of three main parts (Figure 3) that follow the natural progression
of the intrapreneurship life cycle as outlined in Figure 1 (i.e., idea generation to new
corporate ventures). Even though, all these intrapreneurship strategies can and should
be developed in parallel, the intrapreneur will experience each component as he or she
goes from idea generation to new corporate ventures to the positive learning cycle.
First, an innovative environment must be created through the use of cultural and
structural strategies in order to help generate ideas that will eventually turn into new
corporate ventures. These ideas are then filtered through a selection process where the
best ideas are further developed. Criteria for selection will vary by context (e.g.,
company, industry, goals). Some companies use idea bulletin boards and suggestion
boxes for employees to drop off good ideas. On the more involved end of the spectrum,
Facebook uses their famous Hackathons to give their engineers an all-night coding
workshop geared to help them conceive new products. Past successes include the
"Like" button, Timeline, and Chat. The importance and uniqueness of this type of
expedited build session is gaining popularity and top tech companies including Twitter
and Dropbox have already adopted.
Second, there must be a system of infrastructure that supports intrapreneurs,
gives them the strategy, resources, and support to take the new product to market.
More over, a sustainable development strategy for the new ventures needs to be in
place to ensure that the project meets the predetermined targets (e.g., growth, revenue,
etc.). In the case of Tata Refractories (Kamath, 2006), a 40 year old company in a severe
cash flow crisis, the company was able to reinvent itself by creating a strong human
resource development (HRD) program that became the backbone that supported Tata
Refractories' other intrapreneurial strategies collectively called the turnaround
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program. Kamath (2006) stated that "the turnaround program could not have been a
success at all but for the effectiveness of the HRD programs" (p. 118).
Third, regardless of the venture's success, a feedback mechanism we will call the
'Positive Learning Cycle', will funnel back all the lessons learned from new corporate
ventures and instill this knowledge as corporate legacy information for future
intrapreneurs. This information is best captured digitally and dynamically to allow live
feedback to ongoing projects. Senge (2013), emphasizes on the power of the learning
and states that "building a learning organization can be one of the most important
activities for long-term organization improvement and flexibility" (p. 77).
Note that this intrapreneurship methodology is an iterative process that has
feedback mechanisms within each step and that the relationships between each section
are not necessarily linear. That is, the innovator or intrapreneur can at any point of the
intrapreneurship life cycle (Figure 1) move forward or backwards on the way to
creating a successful new corporate venture, or even cancel the project all together.
Figure 3. The Intrapreneurship Ecosystem
IDEA GENERATION: NEW CORPORATE VENTURES:
FOSTER AN BUILD A SUPPORTIVE
INNOVATIVE ENVIRONMENT INFRASTRUCTURE
- Organizational Culture - Venture Programs
* Corporate Structure - upportive Structure
* Venture Discov 
- S inable Development
- Team Forma n
BREAK BARRIERS SUSTAIN GROWTH
CREATE A POSITIVE LEARNING CYCLE
This intrapreneurship process (Figure 3) is built on the assumption that measures
can be taken to create an innovative environment (e.g., risk-taking), which empowers
employees to over come barriers to innovation and become 'innovators' who generate
novel ideas and prototypes. Once these ideas have matured through idea selection,
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market research and preliminary prototyping, proactive initiatives (e.g., venture
funding) take over to give innovators the proper resources to become 'intrapreneurs'
who will take their product to market and produce new sustainable corporate ventures.
More specifically, the fostering of an innovative landscape through cultural and
structural strategies supports the idea generation phase. Successful ideas will then cross
over the innovation threshold to become a new corporate venture. The final outcome of
the venture (both positive and negative) has to feed back to the knowledge pool of the
firm in order to build an ecosystem that build on factors of success and learn from
project failures.
1. Idea Generation: Foster an Innovative Environment
An innovative environment is the foundation that helps members of the
organization generate ideas. In an ideal 'innovative' climate, members can freely create
new ideas without any cost to them (e.g., financially, promotionally, etc.). However, in
reality, a completely chaotic work culture may be at odds with efficiency and hence,
corporate structure is usually set in place to manage expectations and values. The sweet
spot is when corporate structure and culture can work together to lower barriers for
innovation and provide a structured process that supports the intrapreneur in their
venturing efforts. This section will outline how an innovative environment is fostered
through managing risk and reward in an organizational culture, how corporate
structure plays a role in the control, political, and communication aspects of an
organization, and how best to identify ideas fit enough for a new corporate venture.
Organizational Culture - Managing Risk and Reward. Organizational culture is
defined as the "values and beliefs shared by personnel in a organization" (Martins &
Terblanche, 2003, p65). Even though culture is intangible, it is necessary and can manifest itself
in human interactions at all levels of the organization including individual attitudes and
behavior, daily routines, values, norms, and even philosophies (Hellriegel et al., 1998). It is also
considered as a vital part of the overall functioning of an organization and can influence
different processes within an organization (Martins &Terblanche, 2003) including those that
affect intrapreneurship. Schein (2010) states that "IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Ford and any other
company that has had several decades of success will have an organizational culture that drives
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how its members think, feel and act" (p. 42). Organizational culture is further defined as a list of
dimensions (Martins, 1987) including mission and vision, external environment, means to
achieve objectives, image of the organization, management processes, employee needs and
objectives, interpersonal relationships, leadership, which will also be touched upon in later
parts of this paper.
More recently, Eesley and Longenecker (2006) conducted an extensive study that
surveyed 179 managers from more than 20 U.S. manufacturing and service
organizations and assessed their experiences with intrapreneurship. Specifically, they
were asked what factors stifled or stimulated intrapreneurship at their organization.
The study concluded that there were 10 barriers and gateways to intrapreneurship that
were significant at the firm level and a significant number of them related to
organizational culture and structure and not tangible resources, as most may believe.
Many barriers recognized by the majority of the managers were associated with risk-
taking. It seems that when organizations punish employees for mistakes or risky
activities that are connected to the development of new ideas or innovative behavior,
intrapreneurship can be stifled or even wiped out if measures are not implemented to
support risk-taking behavior.
Managing Risk. Risk is recognized as a key ingredient to entrepreneurial and
hence intrapreneurial behavior. Even in an equilibrium environment (Kihlstrom &
Laffont, 1979), where "they [entrepreneurs] differ only in their willingness to bare risks
(p. 746)", less risk averse individuals become entrepreneurs while more risk averse
individuals become workers. These entrepreneurs were also found to be running larger
firms. It is also important to differentiate firm-level risk from individual risk. The
culture of risk at the firm level can be shaped by influences at the individual level
(Antoncic, 2003). More specifically, the firm can influence the individual's perception,
attitude, intention, and behavior towards risk through interactions such as employment
contracts and work evaluations.
In order to foster a greater risk-taking culture and support employees who are
willing to bear the risks of intrapreneurship, the firm must act on several levels and
throughout the intrapreneurial process. That is, not only is it important to create a risk-
taking corporate culture, but it's also important to have structure and support for the
intrapreneur during the progression of the project and have a clearly implemented set
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of evaluations and rewards upon completion (Eesley & Longenecker, 2006). It must also
be made clear and explicit at the organization level and understood at the individual
level the consequences of potential failed projects and how those projects can be
integrated in a continuous cycle of learning within the organization (Dixon, 1999).
For intrapreneurs, first time or otherwise, it is important to encourage risk-taking
through empowerment (Eesley & Longenecker, 2006), so that it lowers their individual
barriers to take on innovative projects. The empowerment can come in the form of
various incentive programs sanctioned and supported by top management that help
foster a healthy risk-taking organizational culture.
Providing Rewards. One method of incentivizing risk-taking behavior,
experimentation and generating new ideas is the use of rewards (Amabile &
Gryskiewicz, 1987). These rewards can be both intrinsic and or extrinsic. Intrinsic
rewards come in the form of personal enjoyment and internal motivation including
increased autonomy, improved opportunities or professional growth especially in high-
level occupations (Mottaz, 1985). Extrinsic rewards are motivations that are attributed
to an external force including monetary gain, explicit recognition, or promotion, which
is a more significant form of reward in blue-collar occupations (Mottaz, 1985). Even
though intrinsic rewards have been seen as more sustainable and shows a stronger
relationship with workplace satisfaction (Mottaz, 1985), either form of incentive can
have a positive impact that inspire individuals to become more creative and innovative
(Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997).
In an experiment conducted by Monsen, Patzelt, and Saxton (2009), they found
that the context and recognition of existing trade-offs and opportunity costs are
important when employees are deciding whether or not to participate in a new
corporate venture. Specifically, the incentive for profit sharing is a good motivator
when the probability of project success is high and if there is low pay risk and job risk
(Monsen, Patzelt, & Saxton, 2009). This means that in order to create an attractive
incentive program for employees such as profit sharing, the employee's salary and job
must be at a minimum risk. That is, if the employee is to take on a new corporate
venture, his or her position in the company should not be at risk of forfeiture and his or
her salary should not diminish significantly if at all. The amount of salary reduction or
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in some cases increase will be up to the discretion of the manager and depend on the
context of the project and the motivations of the employee.
Corporate Structure - Control, Politics and Communication. Organizational
structure is defined as the "formal allocation of work roles and the administrative
mechanisms to control and integrate work activities including those, which cross formal
organizational boundaries (Child, 1972, p2 )." This includes processes that directly affect
inter-firm and intra-firm communication, politics, values, and priorities. More
importantly, organizational structure is also a fundamental part of how the company
operates and can have a direct influence on performance (Child, 1972). For example, an
organizations structure can have a direct impact on the flow of information and
communication within an organization and that can indirectly the affect the attitudes of
organizational culture (Brown & Ken, 1994).
Control Mechanisms. Processes within an organization can be seen as 'control
mechanisms' and are meant to increase desired behaviors of an employee (Das & Teng,
1998). A crucial component of that mechanism is trust and the perception of trust both
at an inter-personal level and at how individuals relate to the firm and vice-versa (Six &
Sorge, 2008) In the context of a corporation, trust is seen as the "belief in the other
partner's reliability in terms of fulfillment of obligation in an exchange (Pruitt, 1981)."
The existence of trust is not only crucial for technological innovation (Hausler, Hohn &
Lutz, 1992), it can also supplement formal controls within an organization to keep
organizational processes open to change, which can encourage intrapreneurial activities
(Antoncic 2001).
In Eesley and Longenecker (2006), many managers indicated barriers to
innovation that were connected to organization structure. Specifically, 35% of the
managers surveyed indicated that politics was a barrier to intrapreneurship, while 31%
indicated communication. The issue with unhealthy organizational politics pertained to
infighting and uncooperative employees. Communication was related to not only the
flow of information within the organization but also pertained to providing clear
organizational directions, priorities, and objectives from the firm level.
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Workplace Politics. Organizational politics is defined as the "management of
influence to obtain ends not sanctioned by the organization or obtain sanctioned ends
through non-sanctioned influence means" (Mayes & Allen 1977, p. 675). The common
vein that workplace politics stem from is the maximization of one's own interest at the
expense of others (Vigoda, 2002). Even if there is a positive outcome of workplace
politics such as recognition and career advancement (Kumar & Ghadially, 1989), it can
still be at the expense of another. And this can create a stressful and aggressive
workplace environment (Vigoda, 2002). As a result, stress that's linked to workplace
politics can negatively affect organizational efficiency (Leiter & Maslach, 1988; Ganster,
1991) that can negatively impact an intrapreneurial organizational culture and reduce
individual performance (Cropanzano et al., 1997).
There are several strategies that can alleviate organizational politics, which can
be deployed at the firm level and exercised by supervisors on the individual level. One
such strategy is to foster understanding and agreement between employees and
management by providing transparent straightforward performance assessments
(Ferris et al., 1989). At a high-level, the organization's goals and priorities need to be
aligned with that of the employee. It's will be up to the managers to decrease workplace
politics by communicating those organizational goals and ensuring that individuals feel
empowered that they can add value to the company (Ferris et al., 1989). In short, first-
line supervisors have the power to decrease affects of workplace politics by enhancing
agreement between the employees and organization about the company's goals and
priorities and fostering a sense of control and empowerment within employees (Witt,
1998).
Communication & Information Flow. Communication is an important aspect of
organizational structure because it controls the rhythm and path of information transfer
(Brown & Ken, 1994). Both intra-firm and inter-firm communications have been found
to be positively correlated with intrapreneurship (Antoncic, 2001). On one side, it's the
active production of feedback the organization gives to its members that can act as
encouragement for intrapreneurial activities, such as risk-taking as discussed above.
However, on the other side, it also requires the organization to receive feedback and
listen to their members about how improvements can be made. More importantly, that
feedback must also be turned into action in order to complete the entire communication
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mechanism or else members will be discouraged to give more feedback in the future
and the line of communication will be broken (Eesley & Longenecker, 2006).
When communication falls apart, information flow also becomes stagnant, which
means that intrapreneurs will miss out on new venture opportunities or opportunities
for project feedback and improvement (Eesley & Longenecker, 2006). Open
communication has been deemed as a critical component of innovation (Kanter, 1984;
Pinchot, 1985) because intra-firm communication facilitates much of the processes that
new corporate ventures are initiated (Antoncic, 2001). Of course, all communication is
not created equal. Though the quantity of communication is important, quality of
communication is also crucial because misinterpretation can easily break trust and
impede on intrapreneurship (Zahra, 1991). More over, communication must exist
throughout a corporation and transcend organizational structure. That is,
communication needs to move in all directions (i.e., vertically and horizontally), much
like a network in order to foster innovation and change (Bush & Frohman, 1991).
In the context of inter-firm collaboration, the open communication platform is
equally important (Das & Teng, 1998). For example, similar to intra-firm
communication, the quality of information flow between manufacturers and dealers
within the personal computer industry was found to be a critical component of
successful partnerships (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). More over, the frequency of inter-firm
communication was also a positive predictor of success for alliances between
biotechnology firms (Deeds & Hill, 1998).
At the firm level, the company must clearly communicate the direction,
priorities, and objectives that the organization operates on because creativity and
innovation relies on a shared common vision and mission (Covey, 1993). Poorly defined
missions were also a cause of failure for early versions of corporate venture programs
(Siegel, Siegel, & MacMillan, 1988). These values and beliefs are set by the strategic
leader and should be clearly defined (Anconcic, 2001). Values that are associated with
intrapreneurship are either individual-centered or competition-centered (Zahra, 1991).
Namely, individual-centered values focus on how the employee is treated and should
evoke to the emotions of a commitment, which outlines the responsibilities that the
organization has for each employee (Kanter, 1984). Competition-centered values are
focused on pushing the organization to achieve milestones relative to its market
competitors.
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Venture Discovery - Uncovering Venture Potential. Opportunities can come
from three main sources: internal, external, and industry/market changes. However,
whatever the opportunity, the highest performing new business developments are
usually in areas related to the firm's core business (Roberts & Berry, 1984) because of
the familiarity of the market and availability of expertise (Pinchot & Pinchot, 1978).
Companies looking to generate new corporate ventures often start with looking at
internal capabilities and markets where these competitive advantages can open up new
opportunities. There are also many problems outside of the firm that need solutions.
Another alternative is to analyze industry and market changes in the recent years and
identify a future opportunity where current competitors are not addressing. This
exploitative strategy can prove to be a great competitive advantage if the firm can
address the future needs well.
There are many different selection processes that a firm can deploy, yet no
screening process is perfect and there is no guarantee for success. This difference
between success and failures are clear in hindsight, but it's almost impossible to identify
a priori. It's not to say that risky ventures are not fit for investment, it just means that
the probability of success is lower (Sykes, 1986).
Selection Criteria. Therefore, in order to minimize the risk of funding new
corporate ventures, firms often perform due diligence on such factors as corporate fit,
amount of initial investment, the intrapreneur's experience, experience with
product / service, competition, IP, gross margin, and rate of return (Desarbo, Wayne, &
Day, 1987). Though similar to the venture capital world, the 'science' behind picking
the right venture varies between managers. Table 2 identifies the selection criteria (in no
particular order) of managers for new corporate ventures. Keep in mind that the list
identifies the due diligence taken when selecting a new corporate venture, however,
these criteria only reduces venture risk and is not a guarantee of success. Analysis of
successful and unsuccessful ventures shows that even experienced teams and qualified
ventures can fail if faced unforeseen circumstances such as steep competition
(MacMillan, Zemann, & SubbaNarasimha, 1986). Hence, it's nearly impossible to
identify and mitigate all the risk factors in the initial stages of the new venture.
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Table 3. Criteria for Corporate Venture Decision-Making
(as adapted from Desarbo, Wayne, and Diana, 1987)
CRITERIA DESCRIPTION
High corporate fit The suitability and relatedness of the venture to the firm's current activities
maximizes skill transfer, which lowers cost of hiring external help and easily
draws commitment from management.
Defensible proprietary Technology that is patentable and proprietary makes the firm's venture less
technology vulnerable to competition and sets up barriers of entry for direct and
indirect competitors.
Experienced venture champion The intrapreneur should already have a proven track record of successful
ventures or have extensive experience working in the area of the new
venture.
Less advanced stage of market The more premature the potential market is the more effort is needed to
development bring in early sales, which is critical for the survival of the venture. Other
important factors of venture success found within mature markets is in-
depth knowledge of the customer base, intense interaction between the
firm and customer and real market need.
Low competition Entrenched competition and high proportion of satisfied customers are
barriers of entry to any new venture. This aspect has to be balanced out by
the market maturity as noted above since more mature markets also have
more mature market leaders.
Technology . The venture's technology should already be under development and
minimal new resources are being afforded to the new venture.
Previous experience with venture Past experience with the potential venture makes it easy for management
product/service to assess the risks and benefits associated with taking on the new venture.
Projected long run business The long-term revenue potential should be at least 5% of current sales.
potential
Previous experience with market The new venture team should have extensive and direct prior experience
with the market that they are entering into.
Projected internal rate of return The venture should have at least a 20% IRR (i.e., annualized effective
(IRR) compounded return rate) for the venture to be profitable.
Risk variability of IRR The IRR risk variability should be no more than approximately 10%.
Projected gross margin The new project should perform at a 75% gross margin.
Initial investment required The initial invest of the new venture should be less than 1% of the firm's
total assets.
In comparison to venture capitalist's criteria for startup selection, managers of
new corporate ventures seem more conservative. Though, on average, the amount of
due diligence performed on new startups versus new corporate ventures are similar,
venture capitalists (VC's) are seen making 'bigger gambles'. MacMillan, Zemann, and
SubbaNarasimha (1986) found that VC's (in hindsight) were seen making investments
in three broad categories of that eventually became unsuccessful ventures. These
categories included venture teams that lacked experience, had no prototype, and or no
clear market demand for the new product. This type of investment would never have
made it through the filters of new corporate ventures let alone receive funding.
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Even though this paper primarily focuses on internal capabilities and factors that
are more 'in control' of the firm, external market forces are also an important factor to
consider (Miller & Camp, 1986). Porter (1980) found that these strategic business units
(SBU) focused on new ventures would on average have an return on investment (RIO)
of nearly 20% when no significant competitors have entered the same market in the last
five years. On the contrary, SBU's that have experienced markets with entries of
significant competitors only had an average RIO of 14%. Also, these new ventures
should never jeopardize the base business (Sykes & Block, 1989). That is, the new
venture should be opening up opportunities instead of potentially competing for the
same market share as the corporation's existing products.
Block and MacMillan (1995) quantified these selection criteria into four
opportunity benchmarks that a successful venture should possess. First, the new
venture should break even in less than thirty-six months. Second, this new business
should experience a gross margin of 20%-50%. Third, the after-tax profit potential
should be between 10%-15%. And finally, the differentiation of this new product should
be based on the product itself and not the price. These benchmarks vary across industry
and size of the venture. Similar to independent VC's, it is up to the company's
discretion to set benchmarks that optimize for their industry. For example, if the new
venture is based on undeveloped technology, then 36-months may be unrealistic as a
break-even point.
Team Formation. Apart from choosing the right venture to invest in, team is
arguably the second if not most important aspect of a successful venture. Even though
the background of each manager depends on the business idea and industry, these
managers have to be entrepreneurial. These successful venture manager characteristics
include market knowledge, high energy, open-mindedness, flexibility, resourcefulness,
persistence, charisma, and team building skills (Block & MacMillan, 1995). It is only
when the venture matures, do managers with traditional skills (e.g., product and project
management), which are good for growing a company, become essential. From the
intrapreneurship lifecycle (Figure 1) perspective, entrepreneurial managers start new
businesses and traditional managers sustain and scale ventures.
Once the team is established, the objectives must be clearly communicated to the
team. Everyone on the team must also explicitly agree and understand the terms that
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they will be working under (Rind, 1981). Early stages of a venture is intense and can
take years for the business to break even. Another important aspect of managing a
venture is to give the team autonomy. Since decisions have to be made quickly and
effectively, it's important for each team member to take on an active role and be flexible
enough to act independently. Bureaucracy and politics at an early stage startup can
impede progress and be detrimental (Leiter & Maslach, 1988).
However, if the venture lacks skilled people, then the venture should be
evaluated more critically. An alternative source of expertise is hiring people from
outside the firm (Rind, 1981), but this is usually problematic because it's difficult to
align outsiders to the same goals and incentives. On one hand, outsiders do not have
the same level of attachment and pride for the success of the venture than current
employees. On another hand, companies may find it difficult to provide proper
incentives for outside experts because they are often new to the company and have yet
to prove real value (Colmen, Perel, & Buffinton, 1979).
2. New Corporate Ventures: Build a Supportive Infrastructure
The definition of a corporate venture (CV) is similar to that of traditional
entrepreneurial venture, except corporate ventures operate under the umbrella of a
larger more visible business (Zenas & MacMillan, 1995). CV's also have similar goals as
startups including increase in sales, profits, productivity, quality, or efficiency.
Corporate managers typically manage these CVs separately from the main business
(Sykes, 1986). Successful companies that have the culture, experience, knowledge, and
resources are able to harness the power of new corporate ventures and boost the
company's overall profits and growth. However, traditional VC backed startups are
known to be more lucrative than internal corporate ventures. In a comparison study by
Sykes (1986), the 37 internally initiated investments by Exxon were less successful
financially than the 18 VC-backed investments.
The scale of a CV varies widely and depends on the resources of the firm. Some
companies have venture managers taking the lead on CV developments or it can be a
corporate-backed venture company managing the entire project. More over, each CV
would hold it's own set of risks and rewards and can happen in a broad range of
companies, markets, and products (Zenas & MacMillan, 1995). The following section
will describe how venture strategy, support structures and sustainable development
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can build a supportive infrastructure for CVs and more importantly sustain growth in
the long term.
Venture Programs. It goes without saying that venture programs vary in
formality, duration, and longevity and differs from firm to firm. Some programs are
institutionalized within the form and provide formal avenues of venture application,
screening, and deployment. Other initiatives are more loosely defined and involve only
a few key decision makers. More established programs provide longer formalized
support from the venturing firm, whereas other programs are more autonomous and
require a low-touch involvement from headquarters. One key aspect to keep in mind is
that the firm's tolerance for risk is highly dependent on the firm's history of venture
successes and failures. That is, firms with a history of failed ventures will be more
conservative during the venture program selection process than firms that have
experienced long periods of success. This is why it's important for the firm to adopt a
diversified portfolio of new ventures including long- and short-term with varying
degrees of risk (Fast, 1979).
Recall that there are internal and external venture programs, however, regardless
of internal investment or external partnerships with portfolio firms, venture success is
directly dependent on how well defined the strategic focus of the venture is. That is,
firms with a clearly established focus and alignment with the new venture and or
external portfolio company more often leads to higher returns and strategic gains
(Gompers & Lerner, 2000).
Support Structure - Managers, Funding, and Time. Even though, lack of resources was
surprisingly not considered as a strong barrier to intrapreneurship by a majority of managers
surveyed in the Eesley and Longenecker (2006) study, it is however still an important aspect of
the intrapreneurship life cycle. These resources include managerial support, time, and financial
resources.
Managerial Support. Another main cause of venture failure is insufficient
corporate commitment (Rind, 1981). Organizational support in the form of employee
training and autonomy to find entrepreneurial opportunities was positively correlated
to a firm's intrapreneurial activities (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). Specifically, managerial
involvement and executive support in the form of commitment, adequate staffing, work
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discretion, time availability, loose intra-organizational boundaries, autonomy and
rewards for venture activities were all important to building a supportive infrastructure
and hence important for intrapreneurship (Hornsby et al., 1990; MacMillan, 1986;
Marrifield, 1993).
More specifically, corporate level (C-level) managers and lower level managers
can both have a positive affect on the CVs success (Miller & Camp; 1986). Even though,
these influences differ on scale, ideally the best mode of success for new corporate
ventures is to receive buy-in from management from all levels of the company, where
all have a shared sense of responsibility. C-level managers can help increase the
likelihood of venture success by creating an internal entrepreneurial environment and
entering the venture into high growth markets where the venture technology can hold a
high competitive advantage. Business level managers on the other hand have a more
hands on approach when influencing new ventures. These managers help by creating
and maintaining a favorable aggressive position for the new venture. More specifically,
this positioning can be boosted an emphasis on product differentiation and addressing
specific customer pain points to name a few.
It's also important to note that the manager's effectiveness is highly dependent
his or her prior experience in the target market and the amount of general managerial
skills he or she has (Sykes, 1986). Even though general managerial skills can be taught,
the knowledge of the target market gleaned from prior experience is irreplaceable, yet
essential to success. In the scenario where a corporation attempts to target a market that
the firm has no experience in, then expertise must be recruited from external sources
(e.g., competing companies) and this can put a more financial strain on the new
venture. As well, these external experts are typically given autonomy, which may cause
misalignment of goals and missions that can steer the venture off course and become
even more of a financial burden.
Financial Resources. Financial resources can be divided into two equally
important resources: incentive compensation (i.e., financial support for the
intrapreneur) and venture financing (i.e., corporate capital for the venture). Incentive
compensations are methods of encouragement for the venture manager, usually by
financial means and provided by the corporation. Meanwhile, venture financing are
direct funds for the development of the venture, which can be used during any stage of
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the startup (e.g., prototyping, marketing development, user acquisition, marketing,
etc.). Table 4 shows options for performance-based financial incentive programs.
On the individual level, all key venture personnel must be adequately
compensated to ensure that all priorities and goals are aligned. Inadequate incentives
can lead to lowered motivation, which affects the new venture's probability of success
(Block & Ornati, 1987). One method of compensation is profit sharing, which provides
the venture manager a percent of the profit made from the venture. However, few firms
have deployed this strategy for fear of paying out too much if the venture becomes
successful. As well, most corporate ventures do not render a profit for years and
managers who initiated the venture would have likely moved on to other positions
(Block & Ornati, 1988).
An alternative method of a corporate venture incentive is giving key employees
options or equity stake in the new venture because 1) equity is at no current cost to the
company 2) the goals of the venture are aligned with the venture team's performance 3)
compensation grows with the success of the venture. The amount of equity depends on
several factors including market price, profit, and level of involvement from the
employee. However, these shares only relate to the overall performance of the parent
company and are not directly associated with the venture (Block & Omati, 1988).
Therefore, managers would not be able to reap the rewards of lucrative ventures since
the profits of the venture relative to the parent company would be insignificant.
More over, intrapreneurs can be hesitant taking on new ventures because of the
career risk and lack of adequate compensation. Therefore, support for the intrapreneur
should out weigh those risks and deem the venture worth taking. These incentives can
come in the form of a promotion, enhanced reputation, and or a pay raise and should
also be in coordination with venture milestones (Kanter, 1983). Studies have found that
a pay freeze alone is not enough to justify the risks associated with managing a new
venture (Block & Omati, 1988). Results from Janssen (2000) showed that employees
were much more innovative when their perceived effort-reward ratio was fair. In other
words, employees were less innovative when they felt that their hard work was not
properly incentivized. In essence, no matter what components the incentive package
consists of, it has to properly incentivize the intrapreneur to dedicate his or her time
and effort 100% of the time.
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Table 4. Performance-based Financial Incentive Programs
(as adapted from Block and Ornati, 1988)
Program Description Example
Bonus awards for specific Given after an evaluation of a Award for an accepted new venture
contributions contribution. proposal
Predetermined and known bonus Given after a agreed upon milestone Reaching the first million in sales
amounts has been achieved.
Variable bonus Calculated as a percentage of a 10% of sales if sales reach $1 million
business metric (e.g., sales, gross by month 3 and 6% if reached by
margin, operating profit, cash flow, month 6 and 2% if reached by
savings vs. planned costs to reach a month 9
milestone) and can depend on
amount of time used for the
accomplishment.
Options for shadow equity or Options or equity that is dependent 5% equity vested monthly over 4
actual equity of the venture on a venture milestone and is only years with a 1 year cliff
monetarily valuable if they are sold
under the provisions set by the firm.
Award of equity upfront Equity that is given immediately to 3% equity upfront when taking on
incentivize the manager's the new venture
performance to make it grow.
Royalties Based on sales dollars or units. This 0.5% royalty on every unit sold
incentive is appropriate for those
who were directly involved in the
creation of the product (e.g.,
inventors).
Salary increase An increase in income, which can A 20% increase in salary for
also be dependent on the role managing the venture for the first 5
he/she takes on in the venture. years after which is renegotiable
Cash Cash bonus for achieving certain 10% bonus upon salary if customer
milestones. returns are less than 2% for that
year
Venture financing on the other hand is the capital that the company commits to
the new venture. This fund is usually provided as a lump sum and depends on the
achievement of certain milestones set forth by the business plan. These milestones
usually occurs in accordance to the company's budget cycle and can include any aspect
of the business including prototyping, market testing, user acquisition, sales, or even
employee hiring. Milestone achievements are awarded additional funding, while
missing goals can lead to re-assessment, smaller awards, or even complete cut off of
corporate funds and dismantling of the venture. The goal of milestone planning is to
break a venture life cycle into more manageable less risky timelines, so that the
company can periodically assess its performance and whether to keep pursuing the
venture (Sykes, 1986).
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It is suggested that early stage ventures should have limited resources, which
constrains the team to only focus on key goals, testing assumptions, and proving
concepts (Sykes & Block, 1989). In later stages when the venture is ready to be
commercialized does a sizable injection of capital make sense. This also lowers the
downside risk of the venturing firm by limiting the amount of initial investment lost if
the venture proves to be a failure.
Time Allocation. Another extension of providing adequate resources for
intrapreneurs is to give the new venture team a realistic amount of time to accomplish
certain milestones. Certain corporate venture programs allow intrapreneurs to take on
the new venture full-time while providing job security for when they eventually return
or get promoted to a new position. It's important for managers to assess the cost and
benefits of having their employees switch to becoming a full-time intrapreneur. More
over, ventures that are managed on a part-time basis are less likely to survive relative to
those that have full-time founders because of the dedication and exhaustive nature of
early stage ventures. It is especially critical in the early stages of a new venture that key
individuals are employed on a full-time basis dedicate time and energy into the project.
Though there are innovation initiatives that can add value on a part-time basis.
Senior managers can insist that their employees prioritize new business development as
part of their job by weighing this during performance evaluations. The idea is that the
startup mentality begins with thinking innovatively about existing capabilities. From
there, employees can more easily produce novel ideas that can potentially turn into new
ventures (Block & MacMillan, 1995).
For full-time intrapreneurs, it's also important to consider commitment in
number of years because a new venture life cycle can last onwards of 10 years. To
optimize the success of the venture, Rind (1981) found that firm's commitment should
last seven to ten years. Firms that committed for a shorter time period were significantly
more likely to fail. And firms that were successful typically took much more time to
develop than originally planned.
Sustainable Venture Development. Once the new venture has reached the rapid
growth portion of its lifecycle, it's important to prolong that growth and develop the
venture sustainably. Unlike the early stages of a new venture where the prototype and
business idea requires rapid modifications to become commercially viable, later stages
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involve achieving better efficiency and sustaining growth (Sykes & Block, 1989). Even
though future projections of growth are approximations at best, these estimates need to
factor in how market, industry, and technical trends will affect the venture. This will
allow the firm to allocate resources in a more realistic manner and ensure that the firm
is flexible enough to adjust to unforeseen market changes. Internally, corporate
ventures rely heavily on two main factors for sustainable growth: human capital and
corporate venture funding. Both elements should be considered for the entire duration
of the venture and be fluid enough to transition between projects and eventually
feedback into the knowledge legacy of the firm.
In earlier parts of this paper, we have addressed the importance of managerial
support. However, it's also important to recognize that it's not only critical for key
venture personnel to dedicate their time on a daily basis, but it's also important to
consider long term commitment. In Sykes (1986), it took an average of 4 to 5 years for an
internal Exxon venture to see its first sale. Therefore, it's critical that the venture team is
prepared and dedicated for the long-term and that incentives are set in reflection of the
entire life cycle of a corporate venture. Another initiative that supports the new venture
team in the long run is incorporating new personnel into the venture to bring in new
points of view (Sykes & Zenas, 1989). This injection of new ideas is expected to
challenge existing practices in the hopes of building a more efficient team and a better
product.
Corporate venture funding is typically initiated from the profits pool of a
company. Though means that profits from the parent company are set aside and
invested in new corporate ventures, it is by no means a sustainable means of venture
funding. Block and MacMillan (1995) state the importance of a feedback mechanism for
venture revenues. Ideally, established ventures that are successful can provide funding
for new ventures. For example, 3M's policy manual states "25% of revenues must come
from products not in existence five years earlier" (Block & MacMillan, 1995).
3. Create a Positive Learning Cycle
The learning cycle of the intrapreneurship ecosystem can be fostered in many
ways including from direct experience, internal human capital, strategic alliances, and
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venture capital investment (Roberts & Berry, 1985). Each source of knowledge should
be constantly feeding back to the ecosystem, so that future processes, products, and the
personnel who will manage new ventures can actively learn from failures and
successes. Each corporate venture regardless of success or failure is an experience that
the firm needs to capture in their legacy. Similar to a new product learning cycle
(Maidique & Zirger, 1985), the positive learning cycle of an intrapreneurship ecosystem
constantly feeds back knowledge learned from existing ventures to the firm. It's this
knowledge that empowers employees to keep taking risks and innovate.
The learning cycle within a corporation operates at two levels: the individual
level and the organizational level. The individual learning cycle is the "process through
which those [individual] beliefs change and those [individual] changes are then
codified in the individual mental models" (Kim, 1998). The organizational learning
cycle is dependent on its members and learns from the collective knowledge pool. Even
though, the individual is constantly learning from their actions and experiences, not all
lessons learned at the individual level have organizational consequences. Kim (1998)
suggested that organizational learning (i.e., increasing an organization's capacity to take
effective action) is most effected when it's integrated with individual learning cycles.
Senge (2013), suggests that the learning organization has a culture that allows the
free flow of knowledge creation, transfer, and transformation. More specifically, Senge
(2013) suggests that there are eight key qualities of an learning organization that helps
companies sustain their competitive advantage that's rooted in innovation and
adaptability.
Table 5. Qualities of a Learning Organization
(as adapted from Senge, 2013)
QUALITY DESCRIPTION
Strong links to knowledge management The mechanism for managing the knowledge of the
company must be explicit and efficient.
Facilitates the development of self-motivated and The learning organization should foster employees to be
creative work force motivated individually and self-initiate to be part of the
innovative work environment.
More than a training department The learning organization must have a rich culture of
learning that extends past just the department
responsible for employee learning initiatives.
Promotes organizational learning The learning must occur at an organizational level, not
just at the individual and should be institutionalized and
achieved for future reference.
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Develops lifelong learning Employees should feel that there is an endless amount
of knowledge to be gained and be always willing to
embrace new understandings.
Involves all employees Every employee in the learning organization is
responsible for generating new knowledge, sharing that
knowledge, and creating the learning culture.
Liberates tacit knowledge Some of the best knowledge is unspoken, the learning
organization should be able to capture all times of
information through formal and informal means.
Adds real value to the organization's activities Learning should not be performed for the sake of
learning, but knowledge needs to be non-redundant,
efficiently captured, and useful to the organization.
With that said, lessons from failed ventures are not as easily integrated into the
knowledge pool as successes. Many firms reward their successes and excessively
punish their failures, which breeds more conservative managers (Block & Ornati, 1987).
This cyclic risk aversion acts as a barrier to innovative ideas that can be lucrative for the
firm. Instead, managers are opting for conservative ventures where the payout may also
be lower. Unlike independent VCs, corporate VCs are also more unwilling to cutoff
unsuccessful ventures because of the potential negative association with a failed
venture. Instead, these corporate VCs prolong their investment and drain more
corporate funds in the hopes of a revival. In this case, corporate VCs should adopt a
more 'independent VC mentality' and write off failing ventures so that the limited
corporate funds can be more focused on ventures with higher potentials.
Roberts and Berry (1985) suggested that companies need to seek lessons from
external sources and make lower risk venture capital investments and strategic
alliances. These external investments borrow expertise from outside expertise who can
have potentially more experience in building new ventures. Investing along side
seasoned venture capitalists or aligning with another experienced firm can add to the
ecosystem knowledge cycle if communication is properly maintained.
Failure mechanisms of this learning cycle come in the form of employee turnover
and closed avenues of communication because the biggest asset of human capital is the
knowledge base that each employee carries with them. Sykes and Block (1989) state that
one method of "protecting the base business" is to avoid turnover of venture
management. However, if the manager must to be relocated, then all knowledge must
be transferred to an experienced successor before the manager departs.
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Conclusion
The claim that the success of leading intrapreneurial organizations is dependent
on a portfolio has been substantiated by the wealth of academic research of different
innovation strategies all catered to improving intrapreneurship within the firm. What's
more important is the ability to adapt to changing trends. Firms fail not because they
did not innovate, but because firms couldn't incorporate adaptive strategies fast enough
to capture the market quickly. However, it is up to the C-level manager to recognize
trends and ensure that the company is not stagnant and to act swiftly and effectively is
he or she recognizes that the current business developments are plateauing.
For the practicing manager, three key themes can be distilled from this paper:
innovative environment, supportive infrastructure, and learning cycle. That is, the
survival of a sustainable startup mentality depends on the simultaneous existence of
these three important factors. It's also necessary to consider all the initiatives within
each theme as suggested in this paper (e.g., venture programs, managerial support,
corporate structure, etc.), however, every firm should have their own portfolio of
strategies that resonate with their existing culture and goals.
An innovative environment is the first step to any good idea and it's the iteration
of those good ideas that make them great. After which, market research and
prototyping will turn these great ideas into feasible new business developments for the
firm. Of course, not all ideas are created equal and it's best to give employees formal
and informal avenues for bringing these ideas to come to life. On one end of the
spectrum, some companies use idea bulletin boards and suggestion boxes for
employees to drop off good ideas. On the more involved end of the spectrum is
Facebook's famous Hackathons. Ideally, the environment is established in consideration
for the existing corporate culture. Initiatives that are too radical may put off current
employees, while conservative proposals may not bring enough innovative change to
the firm's environment.
A supportive infrastructure is imperative for the development of new corporate
ventures. Once the best ideas funnel through the selection process and tested for
feasibility, support from all aspects of the organization is essential for the success of the
new venture. These support mechanisms include managerial, financial, and venture
program support, just to name a few. Here, it is important to recognize the significance
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that the members of the new venture team have on the venture itself. Much like the
importance of the team in early stage startups, new ventures also depend on a group of
highly ambitious and skilled individuals who work hard autonomously yet cooperate
well collectively. These team members must also have a non-overlapping
complimentary set of skills.
The positive learning cycle ensures that all of the experiences and lessons are
captured in an useful way for future intrapreneurs. The method of capturing these
lessons differ between companies but it typically involves an extensive review of the
progress of the venture. As well, it's also beneficial that future intrapreneurs have
access to files of previous ventures so that learning can remain active and autonomous.
Of course, certain security and privacy measures must be taken. With the existence of
cloud computing, companies should also make files easily sharable between team
members so that work is never duplicated and that all documents can be archived in a
searchable company repository.
These three key themes can be achieved through the selection of strategies that
make up the company's innovation portfolio. However, it will depend on the firm's
characteristics including but not restricted to, industry, company size, market
penetration, etc. However, each strategy should add value to the purpose of 1) fostering
an innovative environment for idea generation 2) build a supportive infrastructure for
new corporate ventures and 3) create a positive learning cycle to capture all of the
lessons learned from all corporate ventures.
Limitations & Future Research
Even though the claim is clear that a number of factors affect intrapreneurship within a
firm. The next avenue of future research is how much each aspect weighs in
importance. Many articles referenced in this paper have listed a number of factors that
are important for innovation, however their samples are limited and it's questionable
how applicable the findings are to other firms. As well, it is a possibility that the factors
that affect intrapreneurship vary with the characteristics of the firm. However, if this is
the case, future research should control for those variations. Another important factor to
account for is the temporal implications of innovation strategies because many
initiatives take time to implement and take many more years to build into the existing
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culture. Therefore, studies of previous companies should look at more longitudinal
trends.
At a higher perspective, the cultural relevance of a company has a lot of influence
on the development of the firm and the strategies proposed in this paper may not be as
applicable for firms outside of the United States. Since each aspect of the
intrapreneurship ecosystem was analyzed using papers based on firms in the United
States, further generalizations need to take into account these cultural differences. For
example, the monetary incentive strategies suggested might not work for cultures or
corporate cultures that do not hold money at high value. Perhaps an incentive strategy
that was based on promotion and reputation may be more appropriate in those cases.
There is also a shortfall in recent literature on intrapreneurship within the last 5
years. Even though corporate venturing is not as popular as it had been (Gompers &
Lerner, 2000), it is important to recognize the new trend of innovators and disrupters in
the industry. Therefore, intrapreneurship research design has a limited capacity to draw
inferences on future intrapreneurial trends. However, because of a new shift towards
the startup mentality, there is hope that future research on entrepreneurship will extend
back to the corporate capacity and the concept of new corporate ventures will be better
supported in the modem day context.
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